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1. What is a lie? A lie may be defined as an untrue assertion expressed as truth. In certain cases, truth 
might be told in such a manner that it appears to be false. These acts also may be considered as cases of 
telling lies. The theological definition of a lie is "to deny others access to knowledge to which they are 
entitled". These two definitions of lie are quite comprehensive. 
The Dictionary.com definition of a lie is "a false statement made with deliberate intent to deceive; an 
intentional untruth; a falsehood." Thus considered, a lie is a type of deception in the form of an untruthful 
statement, especially with the intention to deceive others, often with the further intention to maintain a 
secret or reputation, protect someone's feelings or to avoid a punishment or repercussion for one's actions. 
Viewed as such, “to lie” is to state something that one knows to be false or that one does not honestly 
believe to be true with the intention that a person will take it for the truth. These meanings of a lie are 
rather narrow, since they limit a lie to the ‘verbal’ statement while a lie might be non-verbal as well. 
Lying when typically used to refer to deceptions in oral or written communication has thus a narrow 
connotation. Other forms of deception, such as disguises or forgeries, are generally not considered lies, 
though the underlying intent may be the same. Even a true statement can be used to deceive. In this 
situation, it is the intent of being overall untruthful rather than the truthfulness of any individual statement 
that is considered the basis of the lie. Further, an untrue statement, believed not to be so by the speaker, 
would not be a lie, irrespective of its effects (Wikipedia: Lie). 
2. Deception and lies among the non-human beings: The capacity to lie has also been claimed to be 
possessed by non-humans in language studies with great apes. Even Koko, the gorilla made famous for 
learning American Sign Language has been caught red handed. After tearing a steel sink from the wall in 
the middle of a tantrum, she signed to her handlers that a cat did it, while she pointed to her kitten. It is 
unclear if this was a joke or a genuine attempt at blaming her tiny pet. Deceptive body language, such as 
feints that mislead as to the intended direction of attack or flight, is observed in many species including 
wolves. A mother bird deceives when it pretends to have a broken wing to divert the attention of a 
perceived predator, including unwitting humans, from the eggs in its nest to itself, most notably the 
killdeer (Wikipedia: Lie).  
These instances obviously indicate that ‘to lie’ is natural and an ability to lie might be evolutionary in 
nature possibly to help in survival, since in the non-human world there is no point in raising the ethical 
issues. Extended to the humans (as a member of the Animalia or Metazoa), ‘to lie’ may only be a part of 
the survival mechanism.  The cliché "All is fair in love and war" finds justification for lies used to gain 
advantage  in  the  war  situations.  Sun  Tzu  (see  Giles,  2005)  declared  that  "All  warfare  is  based  on 
deception." Machiavelli advised in the Prince (see Marriott, 2006): "never to attempt to win by force what 
can be won by deception".  The doctrine of reason-of-state holds that states and rulers, being charged with 
supreme responsibility for their subjects' peace and security, are not obliged to observe the principles of 
morality if prudence and policy dictated otherwise. In this doctrine dissimulation takes its place as an 
accepted method. The adage, "Qui nescit dissimulare nescit regnare" meaning that he who does not know 2 
 
how to dissimulate doesn't know how to rule, fully justifies deceit, deception and lies as the necessities of 
a ruler (Zagorin, 1996). Thomas Hobbes (1651) wrote in Leviathan: "In war, force and fraud are the two 
cardinal virtues." In the biological perspective, the world presents a war of each against all others. Thus 
viewed, lies are the cardinal virtues for survival and, by implication, the carriers of evolution. To quote 
Nietzsche  (1878:  104):  “If  we  accept  self  defense  as  moral,  then  we  must  also  accept  nearly  all 
expressions of so called immoral egoism; we inflict harm, rob or kill, to preserve or protect ourselves, to 
prevent personal disaster; where cunning and dissimulation are the correct means of self preservation, we 
lie.” Also, “Why do men usually tell the truth in daily life? Certainly not because a god has forbidden 
lying. Rather it is because, first, it is more convenient: for lies demand imagination, dissembling, and 
memory.  …. Then, it is because it is advantageous in ordinary circumstances to say directly: I want this, I 
did that, and so on; that is, because the path of obligation and authority is safer than that of cunning. If a 
child has been raised in complicated domestic circumstances, however, he will employ the lie naturally, 
and will always say instinctively that which corresponds to his interests. A feeling for truth, a distaste for 
lying  in  and  of  itself,  is  alien  to  him  and  inaccessible;  and  so  he  lies  in  complete  innocence.” 
(Nietzsche,1878: 54). 
3. Lying to oneself or self-deception: Self-deception is a process of denying or rationalizing away the 
relevance,  significance,  or  importance  of  opposing  evidence  and  logical  argument.  Self-deception 
involves convincing oneself of a truth (or otherwise) so that one does not reveal any self-knowledge of 
the deception. Nietzsche (1878: 483) proclaims that convictions are more dangerous enemies of 
truth than lies. Therefore, consensus on the identification of self-deception has remained elusive. As a 
result, there are two schools of thought on the conceptualization of self-deception: intentionalist and non-
intentionalist. The Intentionalists tend to hold that self-deception is intentional, but differ from the non-
institutionalists over whether it requires the holding of contradictory beliefs. They incorporate elements of 
temporal partitioning (extended over time to benefit the self-deceiver, increasing the chance of forgetting 
the deception altogether) and psychological partitioning (incorporating various aspects of the “self”). The 
Non-Intentionalists, in contrast, tend to believe that cases of self-deception are not necessarily accidental, 
but motivated by desire, anxiety, or some other emotion regarding a statement/proposition, p, or related to 
p. This notion distinguishes self-deception from misunderstanding. Furthermore, “wishful thinking” is 
distinguished from self-deception in that the self-deceivers recognize evidence against their self-deceptive 
belief or possess, without recognizing, greater counterevidence than wishful thinkers (Wikipedia: Self-
deception). 
It has been theorized that humans are susceptible to self-deception because most people have emotional 
attachments to beliefs, which in some cases may be irrational. Some evolutionary biologists, such as 
Robert Trivers, have suggested that deception plays a significant part in human behaviour, and in animal 
behavior, more generally speaking. One deceives oneself to trust something that is not true as to better 
convince others of that truth. When a person convinces her or himself of this untrue thing, s/he better 
masks the signs of deception (Tivers, 2002). 
Tivers holds that deception is a fundamental aspect of communication in nature, both between and within 
species. It has evolved so that one can have an advantage over another. From alarm calls to mimicry, 
animals use deception to further their survival. Those who are better able to perceive deception are more 
likely to survive. As a result, self-deception evolved to better mask deception from those who perceive it 
well, as Trivers puts it: "Hiding the truth from yourself to hide it more deeply from others." In humans, 
awareness of the fact that one is acting deceptively often leads to tell-tale signs of deception, such as 
nostrils flaring, clammy skin, quality and tone of voice, eye movement, or excessive blinking. Therefore, 
if self-deception enables someone to believe her or his own distortions, s/he will not present such signs of 
deception and will therefore appear to be telling the truth. 3 
 
It may also be argued that the ability to deceive, or self-deceive, is not the selected trait but a by-product 
of a more primary trait called abstract thinking. Abstract thinking allows many evolutionary advantages 
such as more flexible, adaptive behaviors and innovation. Since a lie is an abstraction, the mental process 
of creating a lie can only occur in animals with enough brain complexity to permit abstract thinking. Self-
deception lowers cognitive cost; that is to say, it is less complicated for one to behave or think in a certain 
manner that implies something is true, if s/he has convinced her/himself that that very thing is indeed true. 
The mind will not have to think constantly of the true thing and then the false thing, but simply convince 
her or himself that the false thing is true. 
Because there is deceit, there exists a strong selection to recognize when deception occurs. As a result, 
self-deception evolved so as to better hide the signs of deception from others. The presence of deception 
explains the existence of an innate ability to commit self-deception to hide the indications of deceptions. 
Humans deceive themselves in order to better deceive others and thus have an advantage over them. Over 
the  years  since  Trivers  introduced  his  adaptive  theory  of  self-deception,  there  has  been  a  lot  of 
controversy over the question of such behavior having a genetic basis.  
The explanation of deception and self-deception as innate characteristics is perhaps true, but there are 
very many other explanations for this pattern of behavior. It is possible that the ability to self-deceive is 
not innate, but a learned trait, acquired through experience.  
4. The taxonomy of lies: St. Augustine of Hippo (4
th Century AD) wrote two books about lying: On 
Lying (De Mendacio) and Against Lying (Contra Mendacio). He describes each book in his later work, 
Retractions. The first work, On Lying, begins: "Magna quæstio est de Mendacio". From his text, it can be 
derived  that  St.  Augustine  divided  lies  into  eight  categories,  listed  in  order  of  descending  severity 
(Wikipedia: Lie).  
•  Lies in religious teaching.  
•  Lies that harm others and help no one.  
•  Lies that harm others and help someone.  
•  Lies told for the pleasure of lying.  
•  Lies told to "please others in smooth discourse."  
•  Lies that harm no one and that help someone.  
•  Lies that harm no one and that save someone's life.  
•  Lies that harm no one and that save someone's "purity."  
Augustine believed that "jocose lies" are not, in fact, lies. In the Veda Vyasa’s Mahābhārata, there are 
many instances when a venerable person cursing a victim/culprit utters that the curse could not be untrue 
since he had never spoken a lie even in jokes (e.g. Shringi’s curse to king Parikshita, The Mahābhārata, 
Āstika Parva, Ch. 42, verses 1-2). Such utterances indicate that jocose lies were generally not considered 
very seriously.  
Lies may be alternatively classified as follows (see Wikipedia: Lie). 
(i) Big lie: A lie which attempts to trick the victim into believing something major which will likely be 
contradicted by some information the victim already possesses, or by their common sense. Therefore, 
tricking a victim to believe such a lie is difficult. 
(ii) Bluffing: To bluff is to pretend to have a capability or intention one does not actually possess. 
Bluffing is an act of deception that is rarely seen as immoral when it takes place in the context of a game 
where this kind of deception is consented to in advance by the players. For instance, a gambler who 4 
 
deceives other players into thinking he has different cards to those he really holds, or an athlete who hints 
he will move left and then dodges right is not considered to be lying (also known as a feint). In these 
situations, deception is acceptable and is commonly expected as a tactic. 
(iii) Barefaced lie: A barefaced (or bald-faced) lie is one that is obviously a lie to those hearing it. The 
phrase comes from 17
th-century British usage referring to those without facial hair as being seen as 
particularly  forthright  and  outwardly  honest,  and  therefore  more  likely  to  get  away  with  telling  a 
significant lie. A variation that has been in use almost as long is bold-faced lie, referring to a lie told with 
a straight and confident face (hence "bold-faced"), usually with the corresponding tone of voice and 
emphatic body language of one confidently speaking the truth.  
(iv)  Contextual  lie:  One  can  state  part  of  the  truth  out  of  context,  knowing  that  without  complete 
information, it gives a false impression. Likewise, one can actually state accurate facts, yet deceive with 
them. To say "yeah, that's right, I ate all the white chocolate, by myself" utilizing a sarcastic, offended 
tone, may cause the listener to assume the speaker did not mean what he said, when in fact he did. 
(v) Economical with the truth: Economical with the truth is popularly used as a euphemism for deceit, 
whether by volunteering false information (i.e., lying) or by deliberately holding back relevant facts. 
More literally, it describes a careful use of facts so as not to reveal too much information. 
(vi) Emergency lie: An emergency lie is a strategic lie told when the truth may not be told because, for 
example, harm to a third party would result. For example, a neighbor might lie to an enraged wife about 
the whereabouts of her unfaithful husband, because said wife might reasonably be expected to inflict 
physical injury should she encounter her husband in person. Alternatively, an emergency lie could denote 
a (temporary) lie told to a second person because of the presence of a third. 
(vii) Exaggeration: An exaggeration (or hyperbole) occurs when the most fundamental aspects of a 
statement  are  true,  but  only  to  a  certain  degree.  It  is  also  seen  as  "stretching  the  truth"  or  making 
something appear more powerful, meaningful, or real than it actually is. 
(viii)  Fabrication:  A  fabrication  is  a  lie  told  when  someone  submits  a  statement  as  truth,  without 
knowing  for  certain  whether  or  not  it  actually  is  true.  Although  the  statement  may  be  possible  or 
plausible, it is not based on fact. Rather, it is something made up, or it is a misrepresentation of the truth. 
A person giving directions to a tourist when the person doesn't actually know the directions is in fact 
indulgence in fabrication. Often propaganda is classified as a fabrication. 
(ix) Jocose lie: Jocose lies are lies meant in jest, intended to be understood as such by all present parties. 
Teasing and sarcasm are examples. A more elaborate instance is seen in some storytelling traditions, 
where the humour comes from the storyteller's insistence that the story is the absolute truth, despite all 
evidence to the contrary (i.e., tall tale). There is debate about whether these are "real" lies. 
(x) Lie-to-children: A lie-to-children is a lie, often a platitude, which may use euphemism(s), which is 
told to make an adult subject acceptable to children. Common examples include "The stork brought you" 
(in reference to childbirth), etc. 
(xi)  Lying  by  obsolete  signage:  Examples  are  the  continued  use  of  old  stationery  that  has  printed 
information such as a previous telephone number, or advertising that remains painted on a wall after an 
enterprise has ceased business. 5 
 
(xii) Lying by omission: One lies by omission by omitting an important fact, deliberately leaving another 
person with a misconception. Lying by omission includes failures to correct pre-existing misconceptions. 
An example is when the seller of a car declares it has been serviced regularly but does not tell that a fault 
was reported at the last service. Propaganda is an example of lying by omission. 
(xiii) Lying in trade: The seller of a product or service may advertise untrue facts about the product or 
service  in  order  to  gain  sales,  especially  by  competitive  advantage.  Many  countries  have  enacted 
Consumer protection laws intended to combat such fraud.  
(xiv) Lying through your teeth: When one lies face-to-face with the intended recipient. This also may be 
an expression describing the act of lying with a smile or other patronizing tone or body language. 
(xv) Misleading or Dissembling: A misleading statement is one where there is no outright lie, but still 
retains the purpose of getting someone to believe in an untruth. "Dissembling" likewise describes the 
presentation of facts in a way that is literally true, but intentionally misleading. 
(xvi) Careful speaking: Careful speaking is distinct from the above in that the speaker wishes to avoid 
imparting certain information, or admitting certain facts, and additionally, does not want to 'lie' when 
doing so. Careful speaking involves using carefully-phrased statements to give a 'half-answer': one that 
does not actually 'answer' the question, but still provides an appropriate (and accurate) answer based on 
that question. As with 'misleading', above, 'careful speaking' is not outright lying. 
(xvii) Noble lie: A noble lie is one that would normally cause discord if uncovered, but offers some 
benefit to the liar and assists in an orderly society, therefore, potentially beneficial to others. It is often 
told to maintain law, order and safety.  
(xviii) Perjury: Perjury is the act of lying or making verifiably false statements on a material matter 
under oath or affirmation in a court of law, or in any of various sworn statements in writing. Perjury is a 
crime, because the witness has sworn to tell the truth and, for the credibility of the court to remain intact, 
witness testimony must be relied on as truthful. 
(xix)  Puffery:  Puffery  is  an  exaggerated  claim  typically  found  in  advertising  and  publicity 
announcements, such as "the highest quality at the lowest price," or "always votes in the best interest of 
all the people." Such statements are unlikely to be true - but cannot be proven false and so do not violate 
trade laws, especially as the consumer is expected to be able to tell that it is not the absolute truth. 
(xx) Compliments and false reassurances: "That looks very nice on you." White lies or exaggerations 
intended to please the other person. "Everything is going to be alright". 
(xxi) White lie: A white lie would cause only relatively minor discord if it were uncovered, and typically 
offers some benefit to the hearer. White lies are often used to avoid offense, such as complimenting 
something one finds unattractive. In this case, the lie is told to avoid the harmful realistic implications of 
the truth. As a concept, it is largely defined by the custom and context, and cannot be clearly separated 
from other lies with any authority. 
5. Are women more prone to telling lies: There are sayings indicating that women are more capable of, 
as well as indulgent in, telling lies.  In the Mahābhārata (Anushāsan Parva: 49) it is said that women 
make a lie appear as truth, and a truth appear as a lie. (see http://www.hinduism.co.za/women.htm). In the 
Rāma Charita Mānasa, the author (Tulsidas) writes: “Nāri subhau satya saba kahahēn, Abaguna ātha 6 
 
sadā ura rahahēn | Sāhasa, anrita, chapalatā māyā, Bhaya abibeka asoucha adāyā” meaning that women 
naturally have in their core eight vices: rashness, lying, fickle-mindedness, deceit, fear, lack of wisdom, 
impurity  and  unkindness.  Therefore,  Chānakya  in  his  Sötra  suggests  that  “Streeshu  kinchidapi  na 
vishwaset” or one should never trust the women even slightly (Arthashāstra: Chānakya Sötra: 359) and 
“Strinam sarbāshubham” or in women everything is wrong and evil (Arthashastra: Chānakya Sötra: 
476). “Frailty, thy name is woman!” in Macbeth by William Shakespeare epitomizes a similar social 
belief prevailing in the West. It may be argued that such a characterization of women is partly because in 
a male dominated society women developed these traits for their survival. It is also believed that women 
cannot keep anything secret with them. In the Mahābhārata (Shānti Parva, 7-11), Yudhishthira cursed the 
womankind making them incapable of keeping anything secret with them.  
 
However, researchers at the Science Museum in London, which commissioned a research study, came to 
the conclusion that far from being damaging, small lies can oil the wheels of human interaction. The 
study has concluded that men tell many more lies than women. On average, a man will tell three lies a 
day, racking up 1,092 whoppers in a year. On the other hand the average woman will come out with 728, 
fibbing, just twice a day (reported by Dixon, 2010). It is not unlikely that the observed difference in this 
study  is  due  to  different  types  of  roles  that  the  respondent  men  and  women  had  to  play  in  their 
professional lives. The professional roles of men might have been more lie-demanding. 
 
The study conducted by Feldman et al. (2002) examined the effects of self-presentation goals on the 
amount and type of verbal deception used by participants in same-gender and mixed-gender dyads. The 
study found that lies told by men and women differed in content, although not in quantity. Therefore, it is 
more likely that there is no difference between women and men with regard to proneness to telling lies. 
6. Morality of lying: The philosophers St. Augustine, as well as St. Thomas Aquinas and Immanuel Kant 
condemned all lying. However, Thomas Aquinas also had an argument for lying. According to all three, 
there are no circumstances in which one may lie. One must be murdered, suffer torture, or endure any 
other hardship, rather than lie, even if the only way to protect oneself is to lie. Each of these philosophers 
gave  several  arguments  against  lying,  all  compatible  with  each  other.  Among  the  more  important 
arguments are: Lying is a perversion of the natural faculty of speech, the natural end of which is to 
communicate the thoughts of the speaker and when one lies, one undermines trust in society.  
It is alleged that some belief systems may find lying to be justified. Lying is morally blameworthy in a 
relatively un-obscure way. Although there may be cases of lying to which it may be difficult to take up a 
definite  moral  attitude  (Miri,  1974).  Leo  Tolstoy  is  cited  (Thomas,  1987)  as  describing  religious 
institutions as the product of deception and lies for a good purpose. Forsberg (2008) is of the opinion that 
lying for a good cause is not immoral. Barnes (1994) concludes that although there are, in all societies, 
good pragmatic reasons for not lying all the time, there are also strong reasons for lying some of the time. 
"… everyone should recognize the ubiquity of lying, its inevitability, and its beneficial as well as its 
detrimental attributes. . ."  (Barnes, 1994, p. 167). Nietzsche  (1968) held that lies were a necessity in 
order to go on living and to overcome the harshness of reality (Barnes, 1994, p. 140) and in his “Human, 
All Too Human” proclaimed that those who refrain from lying may do so only because of the difficulty 
involved in maintaining the lie and thus  some people tell the truth only out of weakness. Malpas is 
chagrined to observe the frequent use of deception, deceit and lies in the public life in the contemporary 
world but holds that “deception is not something that can ever be removed from human affairs. But 
deception can only be recognized as deception where we retain a sense of truth. Moreover, where we lose 
that sense of truth, or a commitment to it, then we lose our engagement with ourselves, others, and the 
world, and we lose, not only our sense of ethics, but we lose a sense of ourselves, of others, of the world. 
Deception becomes, not merely self-deception, but self-destruction.” (Malpas, 2008; p. 10). 7 
 
Since a lie is theologically defined as "to deny others access to knowledge to which they are entitled", 
keeping  silence  as  a  deliberate  action  in  the  face  of  an  inquiry,  while  one  knows  something  to  be 
false/true or that one does not honestly believe to be true/false, may be considered as an act of lying, 
although non-verbally. When Kautilya teaches: Dāreshu kinchit swajaneshu kinchit gôpyam vayeshyeshu 
suteshu kinchit – meaning that there are certain sorts of information that should be held back or kept 
secret from wife, women, kiths, peers, elderly persons and sons (and daughters) – he means that one 
should not speak or blurt out all truth that one knows. There are a number of instances in the Mahābhārata 
that suggests telling a lie for a greater social cause or keeping up the ‘dharma’. The saying: satyam bröyat 
priyam bröyat na bröyat satyamapriyam – meaning that one should tell the truth, but only a pleasant 
truth; not an unpleasant truth – has the same moral content.  DePaulo et al. (1996) hold that the portrayal 
of everyday lies as disruptive of social life and harmful to others is in need of modification, because so 
many of these lies are told to avoid tension and conflict and to minimize hurt feelings and ill will. 
 
This attitude to truth and lie is basically pragmatic in nature. The pragmatic philosophy propounded by 
Charles Peirce, William James, John Dewey, George Santayana and others judges desirability or virtue by 
its effects, which are beneficial to the individual/society.  The epistemology of pragmatism has been 
heavily influenced by Charles Darwin. However, pragmatism was not the first to apply evolution to 
theories of knowledge. Schopenhauer advocated a biological idealism as what's useful to an organism to 
believe might differ wildly from what is true. Here knowledge and action are portrayed as two separate 
spheres with an absolute or transcendental truth above and beyond any sort of inquiry organisms use to 
cope with life. Pragmatism challenges this idealism by providing an "ecological" account of knowledge: 
inquiry is how organisms can get a grip on their environment. In this milieu, the ‘will to believe’ of 
William James (1896), might be viewed as a Jungian archetype in the collective unconscious obtained 
through the experiences and the most expedient thumb-rules formulated over the generations in the past. 
Will to believe is also justified on the ground that doubt, inquiry and factual determination of the truth or 
the falsehood might be prohibitively costly in terms of time and effort. On the other hand, Gita (Ch.4, 
verse 39) proclaims – shraddhāvān labhate jnānam – that ‘shraddhā’ - trust or belief - is primordial to 
‘jnāna’  or  knowledge  or  knowledge  cannot  be  obtained  without  trust.  Indeed  all  non-experiential 
knowledge flow from the axiomatic system that must first be relied upon or trusted. Consequentially, the 
beneficial lies also are pragmatically acceptable. Even the utilitarian philosophy would appreciate the 
desirability  of  truth  or  lie  on  the  basis  of  the  individual/social  utility  that  it  has.  Soothsayers  have 
psychological utility. Medical doctors use placebo for comforting the patients, in spite of the criticism of 
the practice that it is unethical to prescribe treatments that don't work, and that telling a patient that a 
placebo is a real medication is deceptive and harms the doctor-patient relationship in the long run. Critics 
of placebo treatment also argue that using placebos can delay the proper diagnosis and treatment of 
serious medical conditions.  Psychiatrists use ‘suggestions’ for treating their patients, which may often be 
the lies.   
 
Nietzsche (1873) rejects the very concept of the (social) truth and thereby renders the moral conception of 
lying altogether baseless. To quote him: “What, then, is truth? A mobile army of metaphors, metonyms, 
and anthropomorphisms – in short, a sum of human relations which have been enhanced, transposed, and 
embellished poetically and rhetorically, and which after long use seem firm, canonical, and obligatory to a 
people: truths are illusions about which one has forgotten that this is what they are; metaphors which are 
worn out and without sensuous power; coins which have lost their pictures and now matter only as metal, 
no longer as coins.”  
 
Ec (1970, p. 69) goes to the extent of holding the view that "a society in which all truths were bluntly 
exposed would be more like a hell than a paradise". This extreme view is akin to the doctrine that a 
minimum level of corruption is a necessary ingredient to keep the society composed, running and stable 
(Laffont and Tirole, 1991; 1993). 8 
 
7. Consequences of objectionable lying if detected: Once a lie has been told there can be two alternative 
consequences: it may be discovered or remain undiscovered. Under some circumstances, discovery of a 
lie may discredit other statements by the same speaker and can lead to social or legal sanctions against the 
speaker, such as ostracizing or conviction for perjury. When a lie is discovered, the state of mind and 
behaviour of the lie teller (liar) is no longer predictable. The discoverer of a lie may also be convinced or 
coerced to collaborate with the liar, becoming part of a conspiracy. They may actively propagate the lie to 
other parties, actively prevent the lie's discovery by other parties, or simply omit publicizing the lie (a 
secondary lie of omission). 
8. The Economics of Lying: Lying is a subject matter of the Economics of Information, a branch of 
economics that studies how information affects an economy and economic decisions. Information as a 
good has special characteristics. Buying and selling information is not the same as buying and selling 
most other goods. First of all, information is non-rivalrous, which means that consuming information does 
not exclude someone else from also consuming it. A related characteristic that alters information markets 
is that information has almost zero marginal cost. This means that once the first copy exists, it cost 
nothing or almost nothing to make a second copy. This makes it easy to sell over and over. However, it 
makes classic marginal cost pricing completely infeasible. Second, exclusion is not a natural property of 
information  goods,  though  it  is  possible  to  construct  exclusion  artificially.  However,  the  nature  of 
information is that if it is known, it is difficult to exclude others from its use. Third is that the information 
market does not exhibit high degrees of transparency. That is, to evaluate the information the information 
must be known, one has to invest in learning it to evaluate it.  Information has economic value because it 
allows individuals to make choices that yield higher expected payoffs or expected utility than they would 
obtain from choices made in the absence of information. 
 
When two (or more) parties engage in some sort of transaction, it is not necessary that all the parties have 
the same (quality and quantity of) relevant information with them. This situation creates information 
imbalance among the transacting parties. This situation is known as information asymmetry. In most of 
the  cases,  information  asymmetry  cannot  be  avoided  due  to  a  high  transaction  cost  of  obtaining 
information. Information asymmetry may lead to biased selection, in which certain types of ‘deal’ are 
more likely to materialize than the other types of ‘deal’. It may also involve moral hazards. Moral hazard 
arises because an individual or institution does not take the full consequences and responsibilities of its 
doings, and therefore has a tendency to act less carefully than it alternately would, leaving another party 
to hold some responsibility for the consequences of those actions. Both of these consequences are the fall 
out of a suboptimal solution, which could not have materialized if the information asymmetry would not 
have  been  there.  Thus,  information  asymmetry  blocks  the  optimal  solution.  It  has,  therefore,  the 
consequences that characterize suboptimal allocation of resources and its implications with regard to 
social welfare.   
 
It is pertinent to bring in some game-theoretic notions here. The process of transaction proceeds as a 
sequence of strategic moves made by the players or the parties involved in the act of transaction, finally 
culminating into the ‘deal’.  Such games of transaction might be a garbage game (negative sum game), a 
zero-sum game or a cooperative game (positive sum game).  The optimal solution of a negative sum game 
is that after the game is over, both (all) parties are worse off or at least one of the parties is worse off 
without making others better (in comparison to the state at which the game started). Overall, the value of 
the game is negative. A positive sum game culminates into a state in which all parties are better off  or at 
least one of the parties is better off without making others worse off (in comparison to the state at which 
the game started). Overall, the value of the game is positive. In a zero-sum game some are losers and 
some others are gainers such that the sum of benefits and losses is zero. In this perspective, a suboptimal 
solution of a garbage game is socially preferable (or superior) to the optimal solution. In contrast, a 
suboptimal  solution  of  a  cooperative  game  is  socially  inferior  (deferrable)  to  the  optimal  solution. 9 
 
Nothing  can  be  said  of  the  optimal  or  suboptimal  solution  of  a  zero-sum  game  unless  some  value 
judgment is invoked. 
 
When a game is played by many (more than two) players/parties, there are ample chances of coalition 
among  some  players  against  the  others  who  are  out  of  the  coalition.  Formation  of  coalition  can 
significantly  affect  the  value  of  a  game.  Strategies  can  be  devised  to  block  the  formation  of  such 
coalitions. 
 
A lie being a type of deception in the form of an untruthful statement, especially with the intention to 
deceive  others,  is the  sine  qua  non  of  information  asymmetry.  The  rest  of  its  consequences  follow. 
However, if a lie leads to blocking of the optimal solution of a negative sum game (and thus forces a 
suboptimal solution to prevail), it is socially desirable. On the other hand, if a lie leads to blocking of the 
optimal solution of a positive sum game (and thus forces a suboptimal solution to prevail), it is socially 
undesirable. Lies can block the formation of certain types of coalition among the players/parties, and 
depending on the possible consequences of the coalitions, appropriate lies may add to or reduce the value 
of a game. This game-theoretic and information-asymmetry based analysis of lying may be carried out in 
the manner of analysis of corruption by Laffont and Tirole (1991/1993). 
 
Emergency lies, noble lies, white lies and compliments and false reassurances are the typical lies that 
block the optimal solution of a possibly garbage game, thus increasing the value of the game. William 
(2009) observes that the big lie (if not the noble lie) remains a working tool of statecraft even in the more 
democratic contemporary states. Grant (1997) has opined: “we do not really expect that our leaders will 
never tell a lie, and I doubt that we would be simply proud if they were scrupulously honest when it cost 
us something.” However, other types of lie may block the optimal solution of a possibly cooperative 
game, thus decreasing the value of the game. Lies seldom give rise to a zero-sum game solution. 
 
9. Concluding Remarks: A lie is an expression at deviance with the truth known or honestly believed by 
someone with an intention to deceive others for certain purpose, social or personal. An ability to lie might 
be evolutionary in nature possibly to help in survival, since it is found in the non-human world also. In the 
biological perspective, each individual is at war against all others. Thus viewed, lies are the cardinal 
virtues for survival and, by implication, the carriers of evolution. In the human world, lying is morally 
blameworthy in a relatively un-obscure way. There may be cases of lying to which it may be difficult to 
take  up  a  definite  moral  attitude.    Certain  types  of  lies  might  be  morally  acceptable  and  socially 
beneficial,  while  other  types  of  lies  are  ethically  and  socially  deplorable.  This  must  be  judged 
pragmatically with the overall social welfare that they entail or produce.     
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